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Derived copy of GLOBALIZATION batch testing
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Introduction

The prime focus of this chapter is upon the process of globalization that has, among other things, materially increased connection between world markets and economies since about 1980. As we shall see, globalization has had many important dimensions. One of the most significant of these has to do with certain aspects of income distribution. The following chapter is concerned exclusively with income distribution generally. The difference between the two chapters is as follows: discussion of income distribution in this chapter centers upon “betweencountry inequality, the gap between rich and poor nations”. Chapter 4 deals primarily with income distribution issues within nations: the share of national income received by individuals in the top, middle and bottom income ranges. There is necessarily some overlap between the two chapters, but this is not only unavoidable, but desirable. We will see that the most recent wave of globalization, contributed to a decline in income inequality between rich and poor nations, but higher income inequality within countries. [\[footnote\]](#)

Globalization

Since 1995 the international press and many learned journals have been filled with articles on globalization, often with exaggerated estimates of the degree and effects of globalization. In recent years, globalization has become something of a cliché. It has sometimes been depicted as a magic potion or a poison, depending on one’s political views. It is neither.

Globalization strictly speaking began 60,000 years ago when the first humans walked out of Africa. It has waxed and waned ever since. The Phoenicians began international trade with tin brought from Wales in Bronze Age (3,000 B.C.). Marco Polo, who fashioned trade deals in India and China, was a forerunner of globalization and he was there just before the Ming Dynasty Empress started burning ships in 13th century China.

Globalization continued in the 14th and 15th centuries. Then, Imperial China became highly dependent on New World plants and Peruvian silver. The latter ultimately weakened the Ming Dynasty. [\[footnote\]](#) Not only that, but after 1492 human-powered exchanges of populations, species and genomes from the New World to the Old had far-reaching consequences for ecology as well as markets. To illustrate only 30 years after Pizarro overthrew the Inca Empire in the 16th century, Spanish farmers were exporting potatoes to France. But the potato was indigenous to the Andes. In turn, it has been estimated that 20% to 30% of world population increase from 1700-1900 was due to better nutrition from the spread of the potato. [\[footnote\]](#)

Jared Farmer, “Pangaea Penultima”, *Science*, 4 November 2011, Vol. 334(6056): 600-601. Ibid, p.602.

J. Nunn & N. Qian, “The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence from a Historical Experiment,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 2011, Vol. 126(2): 593-650.

Globalization in 2014 means different things to different peoples. To some it means the rapid spread of culture and ideas in a world wired tightly together by the internet. [\[footnote\]](#) To others it means growth of international travel and tourism.

By 2014, the number of websites worldwide surpassed 1 billion.

In a course on economics, an economic definition of globalization should be used. Simply put, globalization is “the increasing inter-dependence between nation’s economies, as measured by greater flows of goods, services as well as cheap tools of communication and capital across national borders, indeed globalized communications. There is even mobile network service at summit of Mount Everest, so climbers can call home from the summit.

Popular discussions of: “globalization” implies that it is something of a new phenomena. It is not. In its present incarnation, it began after about 1980. But there was a previous, huge wave of modern globalization between 1840 and 1914.

Between 1870-1914, world trade grew very rapidly, from 10% of world GDP to 21% of world GDP. [\[footnote\]](#) Global capital flows, especially to the U.S. and some Latin American nations (especially Argentina) also grew

rapidly. In 1870, foreign direct investment (FDI) in “developing nations” in Africa, Asia and Latin America was only 9% of the total output of these Nations. By 1914 the percentage reached 33%, a 3 ½ fold increase.

“The Rise and Fall of World Trade”, *NBER Reporter*, Winter 2005/2006, pp.20-21.

However, it is important to understand that there were material differences between the first big wave of modern globalization and the most recent wave, extending into the second decade of the 21st century. The first wave was impelled by growth in international foreign investment. The second wave included much more financial integration across countries, as well as growing trade and investment flows.

The first wave of globalization paused abruptly in 1914 by World War I. The coup de grace was the great depression when world trade shrank precipitously after 1929 to only 9% of world GDP by 1938. Trade fell so sharply that many in the U.S., especially politicians, began to think of the U.S. as a mostly closed economy. In their view, the role of international trade and capital movements were seen as largely inconsequential for the U.S. economy.

Even in the two decades after World War II, in the U.S. and Europe most econometric models depicted a closed economy. This might have been acceptable in 1955 when U.S. international trade was only 6% of GDP. By 1992, [\[footnote\]](#) trade was 27% of GDP and remained there through 2011. Open economy models not closed economy models are needed in these circumstances.

NBER Reporter, Winter 2005/2006, p.20.

In sum, in the immediate years of World War II (1945-55) “closed economy” was not too bad an assumption. Foreign trade was a very small percent of GDP in U.S., and capital movements were then almost all one-way, from U.S. to rest of world. Economists liked the closed economy because it was simple to model: the math was easy. Because the dominant models were closed, people were led to believe that trade and capital flows could be ignored in economic model-building, as well as in policymaking in taxation and trade.

But as the world moved into seventies, eighties and nineties, the closed economy assumption became increasingly untenable for the U.S., Europe, Japan and other industrial nations. It was never tenable for small emerging nations (except the small number of deliberately closed economies such as North Korea and Burma) as we shall see in Chapter_____.

In the eighties and nineties economists began to understand that exports and imports and capital flows were increasingly important determinants of economic growth worldwide. That is, globalization was “rediscovered” about a quarter of a century ago.

Parenthetically, we note that the surge in international trade and capital-flows in the period 1890-1914, was relatively speaking, even more significant than in the late 20th century relative to the size of the economies then. The impetus to earlier globalization in the 19th and early 20th century was perhaps due to three more factors:

1. Sharp declines in communication costs and the rise of newer technologies in communication (telegraphy, telephone). (Figures 3-1, 3-3)
2. Steadily falling transport costs (Rail road, clipper ships) declining trade barriers, rapidly growing foreign investment in U.S. and poorer nations. (See Figure 3-2).
3. Globalization also involved massive migrations after 1848. Example: in Ireland population fell by 45% from 1860-1914 as Irish left for the U.S. In the same period, millions of Italians emigrated to France, Germany and Switzerland, as well as the U.S.

Consider the role of falling costs of transportation and communication in the latter stages of the first wave of globalization (1880-1914) and the years just prior to the second wave.


The invention of the telegraph not only spelled the end of the “pony express” in the U.S. a few years after the civil war, the telegraph vastly enhanced both national and international communications.

Examples:

Note:

In 1453 it took 40 days for the Pope to learn that Constantinople (Istanbul) had fallen to the Turks. By 1869, like the internet today, the telegraph was changing everything. Before, war and conflicts were reported with a lag of a week or so (Europe) to two months (India). By 1869, news of the historic mutiny of native soldiers in India reached England overnight. And now we have almost instantaneous fully ubiquitous communication (Facebook, twitter etc.).

[Figure 3-1](#) depicts the very sharp decline in the costs of sending telegraph messages overseas. Here, these costs are measured by the number of hours of work required for the average person to send a telegram overseas. These costs fell from about 100 hours in 1900 to less than 3 by 1960, a year in which telegraph and telex messages were still widely used.



Note:

In the second wave of globalization, declines in costs of sending international freight combined with very marked drops in the costs of international telephone calls and the marked rise of e-mail traffic to create an environment conducive to the rapid growth in international trade and capital flows.

[Figure 3-2](#) attests to the very substantial cheapening of transport costs internationally from 1974 to 2004.



Costs of air freight fell from 13% of value shipped in 1974 to 9% in 2004. Costs of ocean freight fell from 10% of value shipped to about 6%.

Note:

Finally, the more recent (post 1990) very rapid rise of internet communication, involving very high speeds at very minimal costs per message has been transforming commerce. Total e-mail traffic rose from less than 1 trillion messages in 1995 to well above 12 trillion in 2010, and the number continues to rise rapidly. Further, the number of websites surpassed 1 billion in July 2014, and is also growing at rapid rates.

In any case, the most recent wave of globalization that since about 1980 has drastically altered the face of the world economy. The world economy of 2013 bears little resemblance to the world economy of 1950, or even 1980: consider this very short summary of the rapid evolution of the world economy under recent globalization.

Several countries were flat on their backs after World War II and the Korean conflict. Then they had few good prospects. Some have now become powerful economic engines. Some are surprises; some we now take for granted. In the latter category: in 1954, South Korean per capita income was equal to Zambia's per capita. By 2005, Korea's per capita income was 39 times that of Zambia. Korea, with 1/20 the population of India, had a GDP total size almost equal to that of India in 2005, and India itself has done well since it began its slow process of deregulation two decades ago, moving away from the “license raj” of 1947-1990.

In 1982, China's per capita income was equal to India's. Today, even with India's strong economic record since 1990, Chinese GDP per capita was twice that of India. We can place the Chinese experience in further perspective. A favorite Mao Tse Tung slogan was: “surpass Britain, then America.” In 2007 China's economy surpassed not only Britain but also France in size. China has the 2nd largest economy in the world, and could surpass the U.S. in size by 2030.

Consider also Southeast Asia—almost all countries there have prospered as never before. In the period 2005-2008, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam all had growth close to 6%. Thailand was a laggard: “only” 4.7% percent.

In Latin America Chile displayed unusual economic strength from 1983-2014. Brazil has been growing but began sputtering in 2013. Argentina is sliding toward yet another collapse (a recurring development since Dictator Juan Perón's first term in power beginning after World War II). Bolivian development has once again stalled, Caudillo Chavez and his successor ruined the Venezuelan economy. Mexico struggles with deep divisions, but has experienced growth in recent years.

What of Europe under globalization?

“Eurosclerosis” gripped the continent for the years from 1990-2005. Per capita GDP in the continent’s three largest economies before 2007 had been *falling* relative to the U.S. On average, per capita income for Germany, France and Italy together was 80 percent of the U.S. in 1990. By 2005, per capita income in these three together was only 68 percent that of the U.S. If current trends were to continue, the average U.S. citizen will be twice as rich as a German or Frenchman by 2025. Since 2011, significant growth in Germany has resumed. Except for Germany, and to an extent Poland, Europe has experienced relatively little benefits of recent globalization, but some of the costs and German resurgence since 2010 has been due to a host of factors. [\[footnote\]](#)

See Alexandra Spitz-Oener, et al., “From Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar: Germany’s Resurgent Economy”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Winter 2014, Vol. 28(1): 167-188.

There are many reasons for the pattern depicted above. One of the most important has been ossified labor markets in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. In all these countries, it is almost impossible to dismiss anyone when business declines. And it is generally recognized that there is overregulation generally: with overregulation markets cannot be fluid and adaptable.

Japan’s economic performance in a globalizing world has been uneven to say the very least.

From 1950-1990 Japan’s was viewed internationally an economic powerhouse. In the early fifties, per capita income was only 20 percent of that the U.S. By 1991 per capita GDP in Japan was equal to 80 percent that of the U.S. Then, the Japanese economy entered a long night. By 2004, Japanese income per capita was only 71 percent of the U.S. From 1991 to 2002, Japan suffered 66 consecutive months of recession *versus* only 16 in the U.S. However, from 2003 to 2008 Japan enjoyed four consecutive years of positive growth only to decline, along with all industrial nations, because of the 2008-2010 economic meltdown. By 2014 Japan’s very low fertility rate, is facing a serious aging problem in the labor force, with steadily declining new workers entering the labor force.

Two waves of globalization brought unforeseen change to the U.S. In the first wave in the 19th century the U.S. was a major debtor nation as a consequence of large flows of foreign investment and foreign loans to the U.S. to finance “internal” improvements such as roads, canals and railroads in 1830-1860. By 1860, the U.S. accounted for the largest stock of foreign investment national and gross foreign liabilities (loans, FDI). But, U.S. also had the largest stock of gross foreign assets (or investments overseas). Nearly a century later, after World War II, the U.S. became the biggest creditor nation.

In the most recent wave of globalization it is probably safe to say that there have been two defining elements:

1. The enormous increase in the volume of international trade. Over the past 25 years, the rate of increase in trade (see Chaper____) has vastly outpaced the rate of growth of world GNP.
2. The increasing mobility of financial and physical capital across national borders. Capital flows from nation to nation are far larger and much freer today than in 1950, as countries, including the U.S. Europe and dozens of developing nations liberalized their capital accounts especially in eighties and nineties (See Chapter____).

Japan and Taiwan until recently were major exceptions: only reluctantly have they liberalized capital inflows and outflows, and not to the same extent as many emerging nations. Liberalization of capital accounts means reduced controls on movement of capital in and out of countries by relaxation of strict foreign exchange controls.

We mentioned earlier in the chapter that much of what has appeared about international capital flows in the popular press about globalization is misleading especially about capital flows. Much of the increases in capital flows has been between rich countries. Indeed in 2007 foreign investors increased their acquisition of corporate assets by 90% in one country. That was the United States. In fact, the developingworld's share in global private capital flows fell from 12% in 1991 to 7.6% in 2000.

It is important not to overstate the extent of globalization in the world economy. True enough, the world economy is much more interdependent

than in, say 1960, but, consider that as late as 2010:

- Only 3 percent of people live outside their birth nation.
- Only 7 percent of rice is traded across borders.
- Only 1 percent of U.S. companies have foreign operations.
- FDI (foreign direct investment) accounts for only 9 percent of worldwide investment.
- Only 20 percent of shares traded on the U.S. stock market are bought by foreigners.
- And, because of the global meltdown beginning in 2008, the flow of FDI fell from \$2 trillion in 2007 to \$1 trillion in 2009. (See Chapter____).

In any case, globalization involves ever more tighter links between rich nations. There are now published indices of globalization. One widely used index is published by Foreign Policy.^[footnote] To rank nations, the following indicators were employed:

1. Degree of Economic Integration -the share of trade in GDP and value of direct foreign investment
2. Technological Connectivity -extent of internet users, internet hosts and XXXX services
3. Personal Contact-international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic and remittances abroad
4. Political Engagement-membership in international organization, financial contribution to U.N., World Bank, etc.

See Foreign Policy, June 2007.

Using these criteria, the most globalized economies in 2010 were

1. Singapore
2. Ireland
3. Switzerland
4. the U.S.

(Note: All the Nordic nations were in the top 15)

The most “globalized” of developing nations was Malaysia #19. Note: Japan only #28. France and Germany were only 18th and 21st. In this ranking, Russia was #52, China #54, but China was rising.

Globalization involves large benefits to some, costs to others. Thus, we must ask, is globalization, on balance a good thing or not? The answer depends on your perspective. First globalization and increasing capital mobility causes economic shocks to be transmitted more quickly and fully across borders. This makes it even more difficult than in 1970 to conduct effective monetary and fiscal policies in all nations. Also, a very substantial number of jobs have been lost in rich countries because of globalization, as some industries in developed nations cannot compete with growing imports from emerging nations.

On the other hand, consider that since 1990, globalization has lifted more than 500 million poor people out of abject poverty, in China and India alone. Never before in history has this happened. Still, there remains over 1 billion living in poverty in China and India together.

Also consider the comments of Larry Summers, former Treasury Secretary and Chief Economic Advisor to President Obama (2008-2012). In his view there is a big paradox regarding globalization: even its winners see themselves as losers. [\[footnote\]](#) There is little doubt that globalization has given rise to imbalances and inequities across nations, it is still unclear how much of these problems have been due to globalization and how much to other factors, such as technological change (see Chapter 4).

Larry Summers, “The Global Middle Cries Out for Reassurance”, *Financial Times*, Monday, October 30, 2006.

There are clear benefits of globalization to U.S., Europe and Japan. Growing trade with emerging nations has allowed prices of consumer goods to be slashed, from clothing to electronics. This has placed what once were considered luxury goods into the hands of tens of millions of lower income people. For this reason globalization might be considered at least in part, a “pro-poor” development for the U.S. Also, competition from such emerging markets as China and India has spurred many developed nations on to greater productivity and innovation. Finally, recent research indicates that

globalization has had a positive impact on productivity in large R&D firms in the U.S. and Europe. [\[footnote\]](#)

Michele Cincera & Julien Ravet, “Globalization, Industrial Diversification and Productivity Growth in Large European R&D Companies”, *Journal of Productivity Analysis*, April 2014, Vol. 41(2): 227-246.

Nevertheless, as Summers notes, the global middle class may perceive themselves as losers from globalization.

Measuring Globalization

The degree of globalization, while very substantial, is often overstated. If the extent and penetration of globalization were as great as commonly thought, then an average pairwise correlation coefficient of GDPgrowth across today’s five largest economic areas should be high on the order of 0.6 to 0.7. That has not happened.

Consider the table below, containing pairwise correlation coefficients for the U.S., Japan and the six largest European nations combined, plus China, India and Russia for years 1995-2005.

Only the U.S. paired with or China paired with Japan, Europe, China and Japan have a coefficient > 0.50 .

The average is 0.075, about 1/9 of the usual expectation.

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PAIRWISE GROWTH Real GDP Growth 1995 to 2005

Average Pairwise Correlation Coefficients for the Five Economies Listed = 0.075

	U.S.	Japan	Europe	China	India	Russia
U.S.		0.24	0.54	0.01	0.06	0.01
Japan	0.24		-0.08	0.59	0.28	0.22
Europe	0.54	-0.08		-0.40	-0.36	-0.03
China	0.01	0.59	-0.40		0.50	-0.22
India	0.06	0.28	-0.36	0.50		-0.21

For 2008-09 very little pairwise correlation even U.S. and Europe

"Europe" consists of the combined economies of UK, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France and Denmark.

Sources: World Bank, U.S. Federal Reserve (Table constructed by Woody Brock)

Globalization and Fertility

We return to demographics (discussed in Chapter____) in considering the costs and benefits of globalization. The decline in fertility rates has been worldwide, but the sharpest decreases have been in East Asia, where rates dropped from 5.4% in 1970 to 2.1% in 2011. But rates also fell substantially in South Asia: from 6.0% in 1970 to 3.1% in 2011. Fertility rates in Africa had high fertility rates in the 1960s (between 5.5% and 7.5%, about the same as Indonesia and Mexico). But while Asian and Latin American nations' fertility rates declined steadily after 1970, African rates remained high until the mid-30s, and only then fell sharply. And there has been great variation in fertility rates within Africa: By 2012, only 13 African Nations had fertility rates below 4.0. None of these countries are in the East, West or Central Africa. Another 15 African nations have fertility rates between 4.0% and 5.0%. [\[footnote\]](#)

Jean-Pierre Guengant and John May, "African Demography," *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 2013.

Notice something about these figures for fertility across regions of the world. The largest declines in fertility have been in those emerging nations most involved in globalization, especially those in East Asia (China,

Indonesia, and Thailand). The smallest decline in countries that through 2011 have been least involved in globalization (sub-Saharan Africa). Globalization seems to lead to a shift in the direction of replacement fertility, the rate at which population eventually stabilizes. One reason may be that in countries that have “opened themselves up,” families do not need a lot of children for insurance; instead they may rely on urban jobs or services in rural areas.

Consider now topic increasingly discussed in financial and political circles:

Globalization and “Decoupling”

In 2009 at the beginning of the most recent world recession, doomsayers were predicting a very sharp collapse in the entire world economy. And even in fast-growing countries, China, Korea, Indonesia, Singapore and India, growth did slow down temporarily in Asia’s emerging economies. But by the second quarter of 2009 growth in emerging East Asian nations was 10% on an annualized basis. Also Asian stock markets were up sharply in 2009: examples stock market values increased in Indonesia 80%, China 75%, and South Korea 40%.

But at the same time the economies of the U.S. and the other six big, rich countries contracted 3.5% in 2009. Some have argued that there has been process involving some kind of “decoupling” of economies and growth rates, in spite of claims of growing convergence in economic development (see Chapter 5).

But we should not be surprised that Asian economies recovered much more quickly than the U.S. and Europe. There were at least four reasons for this, none related to “decoupling”.

1. Asian households had debt burdens well below those of U.S. and Europe. U.S. and European householders had to “dig out” of deeper holes than in Asia.
2. Asian households have long been saving a much higher percent of income than in U.S. and Europe. Savings rates in China reached 40%

- in early 2000s, more than double that of U.S.
3. Asia's governments entered the downturn with much stronger government finances, lower deficit (U.S. deficit 2011: 12-13% GDP)
 4. Asia's banks did not join in the debt frenzy that did in so many U.S. and European banks. (In Chapter___ we conclude that excessive leverage (debt) was the prime cause of the 2007-2010 worldwide meltdown.

So Asia displayed prudence in households regarding debt and savings. Asian governments showed prudence in avoiding budget deficits before 2008, and Asian banks showed much more prudence in lending than in U.S. and Europe (see Chapter___ on the emergence of “black swans” leading to the onset of the great recession). This is noteworthy, since there has been a tendency in the U.S. and Europe to view prudence as primarily a western value. [\[footnote\]](#) But, economic prudence has been much more evident in East Asia.

See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books 1930). See also R.H. Tawney, *Religion and The Rise of Capitalism* (London: Harcourt Brace, 1926).

In any case, we have seen that, however measured, the results of globalization have so far been mixed. One response, coming from those who have incurred costs, such as labor unions in U.S. and Europe, has been pressures for a return to protectionism, especially more restriction on imports from China, Brazil, Columbia and other emerging nations.

However, except for some labor unions in U.S., France and other rich nations, most critics of globalization agree that more protectionism is not a constructive response to globalization. And we will see in Chapter___ that protectionism often leads mainly to self-inflicted wounds.

Above all, one fact seems indisputable: If economic growth is viewed as a “good” thing, it should be to understand that sustained growth requires that a country leverage the resources and technology of the global economy. There are no known exceptions to this rule. China has proven this emphatically.

Globalization and Inequality

Globalization gains, we have already noted come with costs. These include:

- Global inequality has declined with globalization. That is to say, only that the distribution of income has narrowed as between rich and poor nations. [\[footnote\]](#)
Effects of globalization on income distribution are discussed more fully in the next chapter (4).
- As to income distribution within poor nations, the picture is mixed. While there is some evidence that globalization has helped reduce income inequality within poor nations, there is also evidence that from 1998-2008 income growth in the middle percentiles (35th to 70th) was materially faster than for the lowest 4 deciles). [\[footnote\]](#)
Branko Milanovic and Christopher Lakner, “Global Income distribution: from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession,” *World Bank Working Paper #6719*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.
- Second, there has been some rising inequality of income within rich countries, such as U.S. and Britain, due only partly to declining income of the bottom of the income distribution (see Chapter 4).

Interesting fact: The number of (U.S. dollar) billionaires in the world rose from 400 to 1,000 in 1996 to 1,000 in 2010 (Forbes). But after 1996 fastest growth of billionaires was in the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). This group of nations had about 220 billionaires in 2010, compared to almost NO billionaires in 1990. [\[footnote\]](#)

Forbes Magazine.

Within emerging nations consider experience with China and Mexico. Globalization (greater economic openness) has apparently contributed to rising inequality in some nations, including China and Mexico. Recall:

The Gini Index (coefficiencies) for both countries has risen. In China, it rose from 30 in 1982 (beginning of reforms leading to more openness) to 40 in 2005.

The increase in Mexico was slight. Gini was 45 in 1982. By 2005 it was 46.

The biggest winners in both countries: skilled workers, the biggest losers in both countries: unskilled workers.

(Note again the role of Human K. Formation)

What about developed nations?

In the past 35 years the share of the top decile in the income distribution in most of continental Europe (except France) and Japan increased hardly at all. But in 3 Northern-Hemispheric, English-speaking nations: Britain, Canada and the U.S. the share of the top decile increased notably.

In the U.S. the top deciles share was 33% in 1972, then rose to 42% in 2008.

And significantly, the share of top 0.1% of income earners in all the English speaking nations rose sharply from 2% of income to 5.5% of income.

[\[footnote\]](#)

See Thomas Piketty, *Capital*.

What caused this? Lower taxes on the rich? More income to capital owners? According to some, the cause has been sharply increased rewards to the “Working Rich”. This group includes professional athletes, plaintiff lawyers, CEOs of fortune 500s). This group replaced capital income earners at the top of income distribution in English speaking nations. [\[footnote\]](#)
Piketty, Ibid.

The reasons for this development are still unclear.

Globalization is part of the answer. Technological change is also part of the answer. But much is still unexplained? One possibility is “Tournament Economics”, wherein the “winner takes all” in competition for top positions may play a role. [\[footnote\]](#)

The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us, by Robert H. Frank, Philip J. Cook, Penguin Books (September 1, 1996).

Economists Sudhir Anand and Paul Segal conclude there is no consensus regarding the direction of changes in the Gini worldwide. [\[footnote\]](#) Actually need to consider closely how globalization limits the scope reducing income inequality in the future. Also we will later consider effects of the rebirth of state capitalism on income distribution, when we consider state-owned enterprises in the economies of emerging nations.

Anand, Sudhir & Paul Segal. 2008. "What Do We Know about Global Income Inequality?" *Journal of Economic Literature*, 46(1): 57-94. DOI: 10.1257/jel.46.1.57.

Globalization and Future Income Redistribution

Why might globalization make future redistribution more difficult? That is, can nations do much to reduce inequality in a globalizing world?

Redistribution in the coming year will be more difficult if only because of the high degree of international mobility of capital makes it harder for governments to increase taxes on capital because capital can migrate. Individual countries therefore lose some degrees of freedom in policy-making.

But income redistribution will continue to be an important political issue in democracies at least. Alexis de Tocqueville, a Frenchman long ago presented interesting arguments about redistribution in his 1838 book, Democracy in America. [\[footnote\]](#)

The Project Gutenberg EBook of Democracy in America, Volume 1 (of 2), by Alexis de Tocqueville. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815.htm>.

He wrote: "Democracy is safe until the politicians discover you can bribe people with their own money".

Globalization: The Continuing Rise of China

Globalization has coincided with the emergence of China as a major importer from, and foreign investor in, emerging nations. In the past decade Chinese firms have been, by far, the largest investors in natural resource

sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was in fact a major issue in Ghana's Presidential elections in 2012. In the past 5 years, Chinese investment in Latin American oil and gas, copper and other hard minerals sector has been accelerating very rapidly.

We are witnessing something never seen before, a giant country half very prosperous, and half very poor, moving rapidly toward technological military and economic parity with the west, so that within a few years China may again have the world's largest economy, reclaiming the rank it had in 1820.

Generally from 1820-2000, the ratio of per capita income between the richest and the poorest countries increased by almost a factor of five.

In recent years, as noted earlier, this ratio has been declining. By the end of this book it is hoped that you will understand a great deal about how this came about.

Finally, we will see in Chapter___ that globalization has meant that economic shocks in one part of the globe travel much faster to the rest of the world than even 25 years ago. This makes the conduct of all economic policies even more difficult now than in past.

Demo Module

Wykorzystanie paradygmatu społeczno - kulturowego w terapii

Perspektywa społeczno-kulturowa dotyczy człowieka, jego zachowań oraz objawów powstających w kontekście określonej kultury i otoczenia. Na przykład José jest 18-letnim Latynosem z tradycyjnej rodziny. Pojawił się na terapii z powodu depresji. Już podczas konsultacji wyjawiał, że jest gejem i stresuje się, jak powiadomić o tym rodzinę. Wyjawiał również, że martwi się, ponieważ według religii, w której się wychował, homoseksualizm jest złem. Jak na José wpływa jego pochodzenie religijne i kulturowe? Jak jego pochodzenie kulturowe może wpłynąć na reakcję jego rodziny, jeśli José powie jej, że jest gejem?

Ponieważ nasze społeczeństwo staje się coraz bardziej wieloetniczne i wielorasowe, specjaliści ds. zdrowia psychicznego muszą rozwijać w sobie **kompetencje kulturowe**(ang. cultural competence) ([\[link\]](#)). Oznacza to, że muszą zrozumieć i potrafić zająć się kwestiami rasy, kultury i pochodzenia etnicznego swoich klientów. Muszą także opracować strategie skutecznego zaspokajania potrzeb różnych populacji, dla których popularne terapie adresowane do osób z kręgu kultury europejskiej mają ograniczone zastosowanie (Sue, 2004). Na przykład doradca, który prowadzi terapię skoncentrowaną na podejmowaniu indywidualnych decyzji, może być nieskuteczny w pomaganiu klientowi chińskiemu z kolektywistycznym podejściem do rozwiązywania problemów, charakterystycznym dla jego kultury pochodzenia (Sue, 2004).

Doradztwo i terapia wielokulturowe oferują zarówno doraźną pomoc, jak i terapię, gdzie metody i cele określane są zgodnie z wartościami i doświadczeniami danego kręgu kulturowego.

Dzięki temu można rozpoznać utożsamianie się klienta z jego wartościami indywidualnymi, grupowymi oraz uniwersalnymi dla danej kultury. Tym samym w terapii mogą być użyte strategie zarówno uniwersalne, jak i specyficzne dla danej kultury, co zapewnia równowagę pomiędzy indywidualizmem a kolektywizmem w całym procesie diagnozy i leczenia klienta

(Sue, 2001).

Ta perspektywa terapeutyczna już na samym początku leczenia uwzględnia wpływ norm społecznych i kulturowych. Terapeuci korzystający z tej perspektywy współpracują z klientami w celu stworzenia unikatowego podejścia do leczenia, integrującego zarówno wzorce kulturowe klienta, jak i jego konkretną sytuację problemową (Stewart, Simmons, & Habibpour, 2012).

Perspektywa społeczno-kulturowa może dotyczyć metod pracy w terapii indywidualnej, grupowej, rodzinnej i terapii par.

[missing_resource: CNX_Psych_16_05_Ethnic.jpg]

Jak twoje przekonania kulturowe i religijne wpływają na twoje podejście do leczenia zdrowia psychicznego? (źródło: Staffan Scherz; Alejandra Quintero Sinisterra; Pedro Ribeiro Simões; Agustin Ruiz; Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team; Arian Zwegers; “Wonderlane”/Flickr; Shiraz Chanawala).

Note:

Link to Learning

Obejrzyj ten krótki [\[link\]film](#), aby dowiedzieć się więcej o kompetencjach kulturowych i terapii z uwzględnieniem aspektów społeczno-kulturowych.

Przeszkody w leczeniu

Według statystyk mniejszości etniczne rzadziej korzystają z usług leczenia zdrowia psychicznego niż Amerykanie rasy białej z klasy średniej (Alegría et al., 2008; Richman, Kohn-Wood, & Williams, 2007). Dlaczego tak jest?

Być może powodem jest dostępność usług zdrowia psychicznego. Mniejszości etniczne i osoby o niskim statusie społeczno-ekonomicznym twierdzą, że takimi barierami są dla nich brak ubezpieczenia, brak możliwości transportu i czas (Thomas & Snowden, 2002). Jednak naukowcy odkryli, że nawet biorąc pod uwagę poziom dochodów i czynnik ubezpieczenia, mniejszości etniczne znacznie rzadziej szukają i korzystają z usług w zakresie leczenia zdrowia psychicznego. Te różnice pozostają istotne nawet, gdy dostęp do psychoterapii jest porównywalny we wszystkich grupach etnicznych i rasowych (Richman et al., 2007).

W badaniu z udziałem tysięcy kobiet stwierdzono, że częstość występowania anoreksji była podobna u różnych ras, ale już *bulimia nervosa* wśród latynoskich i afroamerykańskich kobiet była bardziej rozpowszechniona w porównaniu z kobietami rasy białej (Marques et al., 2011). Chociaż więc te ostatnie mają podobne lub wyższe wskaźniki zaburzeń odżywiania, kobiety latynoskie i afroamerykańskie cierpiące na te choroby wykazują znacznie mniejszą tendencję do poszukiwania i angażowania się w leczenie niż kobiety rasy białej.

Odkrycia te sugerują ograniczenia kobiet latynoskich i afroamerykańskich w dostępie do opieki zdrowotnej (leczenia klinicznego i konsultacji). Może to być również kwestia niechęci do mówienia o prywatnych sprawach rodziny, braku terapii dwujęzycznych, postrzegania leczenia psychicznego jako stygmatyzującego, a także lęku przed niezrozumieniem i braku edukacji na temat zaburzeń odżywiania.

Do zróżnicowania w dostępie do terapii może także przyczyniać się postrzeganie i podejście do usług leczenia zdrowia psychicznego. Niedawne badania **Kolegium Królewskiego w Londynie** (ang. **King's College in London**) wykazały wiele złożonych powodów, dla których ludzie nie szukają leczenia: samowystarczalność i brak potrzeby szukania pomocy, nieuznawanie terapii za skuteczną, obawy o poufność oraz wiele skutków potencjalnej stygmatyzacji i wstydu (Clement et al., 2014).

Ponadto osoby należące do grup etnicznych, które już zgłaszają obawy dotyczące uprzedzeń i dyskryminacji, rzadziej szukają pomocy w przypadku choroby psychicznej, ponieważ uważają ją za dodatkowe obciążenie (Gary, 2005; Townes, Cunningham, & Chavez-Korell, 2009;

Scott, McCoy, Munson, Snowden, & McMillen, 2011). W jednym z ostatnich badań, w którym wzięło udział 462 starszych Amerykanów pochodzenia koreańskiego (w wieku powyżej 60 lat), wielu uczestników mówiło o swoich objawach depresji. 71% z nich wyznało jednak, że uważają depresję za oznakę osobistej słabości, a 14% stwierdziło, że posiadanie chorego krewnego przyniosłoby wstyd ich rodzinie (Jang, Chiriboga, & Okazaki, 2009).

Różnice językowe stanowią kolejną barierę w leczeniu. W poprzednim badaniu nad nastawieniem Amerykanów koreańskiego pochodzenia wobec leczenia zdrowia psychicznego stwierdzono, że w miejscu, w którym przeprowadzono cytowane badania (Orlando i Tampa na Florydzie), nie było profesjonalistów w zakresie psychoterapii mówiących po koreańsku (Jang et al., 2009). Ze względu na rosnącą liczbę ludzi z różnych środowisk etnicznych terapeuci i psychologowie powinni nabyć wiedzę i umiejętności, aby stać się kompetentnymi także kulturowo (Ahmed, Wilson, Henriksen, & Jones, 2011). Osoby prowadzące terapię muszą podchodzić do tego procesu w kontekście kultury właściwej dla każdego klienta (Sue & Sue, 2007).

Note:

Dig Deeper

Postrzeganie psychoterapii

Do czasu ukończenia przez dziecko szkoły średniej 20% jego kolegów i koleżanek z klasy — czyli jeden nastolatek na pięcioro — będzie miało problemy ze zdrowiem psychicznym (Ministerstwo Zdrowia i Pomocy Społecznej Stanów Zjednoczonych [ang. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services], 1999), a 8% — czyli około jedno dziecko na dwanaścioro — będzie próbowało popełnić samobójstwo (Centra Kontroli i Prewencji Chorób [ang. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], 2014). Spośród wszystkich osób z klasy doświadczających zaburzeń psychicznych jedynie 20% otrzyma profesjonalną pomoc (U.S. Public Health Service, 2000). Dlaczego tak się dzieje?

Wydaje się, że społeczeństwo negatywnie postrzega dzieci i nastolatków z zaburzeniami zdrowia psychicznego. Wyniki ankiet przeprowadzonych

przez naukowców z Uniwersytetu Indiany, Uniwersytetu Wirginii i Uniwersytetu Columbia wśród ponad 1300 dorosłych osób w USA wskazują, że ludzie uważają, iż dzieci z depresją są skłonne do przemocy i że jeśli dziecko jest leczone z powodu zaburzenia psychicznego, to jest bardziej prawdopodobnie, iż zostanie ono odrzucone przez rówieśników ze szkoły.

Innym powszechnym powodem, mocno podkreślanym zwłaszcza w polskich realiach, jest brak dostępu do specjalistycznej opieki zdrowotnej, szczególnie w przypadku dzieci i młodzieży. W Polsce liczba psychiatrów dziecięcych jest dramatycznie mała — wg danych Naczelnej Izby Lekarskiej to jedynie 419 czynnych zawodowo lekarzy (dane za I kwartał 2019 r.). Dla porównania, psychiatrów z prawem wykonywania zawodu dla osób dorosłych jest w Polsce dziesięciokrotnie więcej — 4165.

Według danych NFZ w całej Polsce jest 37 oddziałów dziennych psychiatrii dzieci i młodzieży. Część województw nie ma podpisanych umów na prowadzenie dziennych oddziałów psychiatrycznych. W kolejce do przyjęcia na oddział całodobowy między marcem a kwietniem 2019 r. czekały w sumie 634 osoby. Czas oczekiwania na przyjęcie na oddział psychiatryczny w przypadkach braku bezpośredniego zagrożenia życia to od 7 do 720 dni. Mediana to 36 dni, a niechlubny rekord (720 dni) należy do szpitala klinicznego im. Karola Jonchera UM im. Karola Marcinkowskiego w Poznaniu. W przypadku stanu zagrażającego życiu czas oczekiwania wynosi średnio 12 –13 dni (uśrednione dane ze wszystkich województw w Polsce).

Średni czas oczekiwania na wizytę u psychiatry dziecięcego to rok w przypadku refundacji NFZ (Raport Watchdog, 2019). W placówkach prywatnych minimalny czas oczekiwania wynosi obecnie 2,5 miesiąca.

Podsumowanie

Perspektywa społeczno-kulturowa dotyczy ciebie, twoich zachowań oraz objawów w kontekście twojej kultury i kraju pochodzenia. Klinicyści stosujący to podejście włączają przekonania kulturowe i religijne do procesu terapeutycznego. Badania wykazały, że mniejszości etniczne rzadziej korzystają z usług zdrowia psychicznego niż ich amerykańscy

odpowiednicy z białej klasy średniej. Przeszkodami w leczeniu są : brak ubezpieczenia, możliwości transportowe i czas, obawy przed leczeniem oraz bariery językowe, a także kulturowy pogląd związany ze stygmatem zaburzenia psychicznego.

Review Questions

Exercise:

Problem:

Perspektywa społeczno-kulturowa dotyczy człowieka, jego zachowań oraz objawów w kontekście _____.

- wykształcenia
- statusu społeczno-ekonomicznego
- kultury i pochodzenia
- wieku

Solution:

C

Exercise:

Problem:

Który z poniższych czynników *nie* jest przeszkodą w podjęciu leczeniu zdrowia psychicznego?

- obawa przed leczeniem
- język

- środek transportu
- bycie członkiem większości etnicznej

Solution:

D

Critical Thinking Question

Exercise:**Problem:**

Lashawn to 24-letnia Afroamerykanka od lat zmagająca się z bulimią. Wie, że ma problem, ale nie chce pójść na psychoterapię. Z jakich możliwych powodów Lashawn waha się szukać fachowej pomocy?

Solution:

Jednym z powodów może być to, że jej kultura uważa chorobę psychiczną za piętno. Poza tym Lashawn być może nie ma ubezpieczenia i martwi się kosztami terapii. Może się też obawiać, że biały doradca nie zrozumie jej pochodzenia kulturowego, więc nie będzie mogła się przed nim otworzyć. Być może wierzy, że jest samowystarczalna, i wmawia sobie, że jest silną kobietą, która może samodzielnie rozwiązać swój problem bez uciekania się do pomocy terapeuty.

Personal Application Question

Exercise:

Problem:

A jakie jest twoje podejście do leczenia zdrowia psychicznego? Czy impulsem do szukania leczenia byłyby dla ciebie uciążliwe objawy lub problemy z funkcjonowaniem w życiu? Uzasadnij, dlaczego. W jaki sposób według ciebie twoje przekonania kulturowe i/ lub religijne wpływają na twoje zdanie o interwencji psychologicznej?

Glossary

kompetencje kulturowe (ang. cultural competence)

Ujmowanie przez terapeutę w procesie terapii specyfiki osoby wynikającej z jego przynależności etnicznej i kultury kraju pochodzenia.